Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism


Transcendental Ontology in German Idealism: Schelling and Hegel sheds remarkable light on a question central to post-Kantian philosophy: after the Copernican Revolution in philosophy, what can philosophy say about the world or reality as such? What remains of ontology’s task after Kant? This is a question often overlooked in contemporary scholarship on German Idealism.

Markus Gabriel offers a refreshing reinvigoration of a range of questions concerning scepticism, corporeality, freedom, the question of being, the absolute and the modal status of our determinations and judgments, all crucial to our understanding of the truly radical nature of post-Kantian philosophy. Gabriel’s assessment of the experiments undertaken in post-Kantian ontology reaffirms Schelling’s and Hegel’s place at the heart of contemporary metaphysics. The book shows how far we still have to go in mining the thought of Hegel and Schelling and how exciting, as a result, we can expect twenty-first century philosophy to be.


Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1: The Ontology of Knowledge
I Schelling, Hegel, and the Metaphysical Truth of Skepticism
II Absolute Identity and Refl ection: Kant, Hegel, McDowell
III The Pathological Structure of Representation As Such: Hegel’s Anthropology

Chapter 2: Schelling’s Ontology of Freedom
I Unprethinkable Being and the Event: The Concept of Being in Late Schelling and Late Heidegger
II Belated Necessity: God, Man, and Judgment in Schelling’s Late Philosophy

Chapter 3: Contingency or Necessity? Schelling versus Hegel
I The Dialectic of the Absolute: Hegel’s Critique of Transcendent Metaphysics
II The Spielraum of Contingency: Schelling and Hegel on the Modal Status of Logical Space


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